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  The proximate cause of the Great Irish Famine (1846-52) was the fungus 
phythophtera infestans (or potato blight), which reached Ireland in the fall of 1845.  The 
fungus destroyed about one-third of that year's crop, and nearly all that of 1846.  After a 
season's remission, it also ruined most of the 1848 harvest.  These repeated attacks made 
the Irish famine more protracted than most.  Partial failures of the potato crop were 
nothing new in Ireland before 1845, but damage on the scale wrought by the ecological 
shock of potato blight was utterly unprecedented (Solar 1989; Bourke 1993; Clarkson and 
Crawford 2001).  However, the famine would not have been nearly so lethal had Ireland's 
dependence on the potato been less.  The experience of other European economies in the 
1840s is telling in this respect.  In Ireland the daily intake of the third or so of the 
population mainly reliant on the potato was enormous:  4-5 kilos daily per adult male 
equivalent for most of the year.   After allowing for non-human consumption and 
provision for seed, the 2.1 million acres (or 0.8 million hectares) under potatoes in the 
early 1840s produced 6.2 million metric tons for human consumption.  That amounted to 
an average daily intake of 4.6 lbs (or over two kilos) per man, woman, and child.  In 
France, by comparison, the average daily intake of potatoes was only 165 grams in 1852; 
in Norway in the early 1870s, 540 grams; in the Netherlands about 800 grams in the 
1840s; in Belgium 640 grams.  A few European regions -- Belgian Flanders, parts of 
                                                 
1 To appear in Cormac Ó Gráda , Richard Paping and Eric Vanhaute (eds.), 
 The potato famine of 1845-1850: causes and effects of the 'last' European subsistence 
crisis (CORN Publication Series: Comparative Rural History of the North Sea Area). 
 
  1Prussia, and Alsace -- came closer to the Irish norm, however (for sources see Ó Gráda 
1999: 18, 237).  Table 1 (based on Bourke 1993: 90-113; Mokyr 1981) gives a sense of 
the potato's importance in the Irish rural economy. 
 
TABLE 1: ALLOCATION OF THE POTATO CROP IN THE EARLY 1840s  
 
    A. Human Consumption in Ireland: 
Occupation   Population     
(millions) 
Annual Consumption  
(metric tons) 
Labourers       3.3               3.9 
Cottiers       1.4               0.8 
Small farmers       0.5               0.3 
Large farmers       0.25               0.1 
Textile workers       0.75               0.4 
Other workers       0.85               0.4 
Professional et al.       0.95               0.3 
       
Total       8.2               6.2 
  
B. Other Uses: 
Animal consumption: pigs              2.6 
Animal consumption: cattle              1.8 
Animal consumption: horses and other              0.3 
Exports              0.2 





  In Ireland the potato's initial impact was as a seasonal garden crop, 
complementing a diet based mainly on oatmeal and dairy products, in the seventeenth 
century.  The precise contours of its subsequent diffusion are controversial, but its 
consumption rose over time, and by the 1840s poverty had reduced the bottom one-third 
or so of the population to almost exclusive dependence on it for sustenance.  Before the 
potato assumed such dominance, it arguably lessened the risks of severe famine in a 
  2country where earlier famines (in 1649-52 and 1740-1) had wrought devastation that was 
probably at least on a par, relatively speaking, with that of the 1840s.   
  Human consumption accounted for only half of Irish potato production: this 
meant that in the event of failure the portion normally reserved for pigs and hens acted as 
a crude buffer-stock.  Ireland's moist climate, moreover, gave it a comparative advantage 
in potato cultivation, and potato yields were high:  about fifteen metric tons per hectare.  
The potato tended to alternate with grain in the crop rotation, and played a useful role in 
preparing the soil for grain crops, of which oats was the most important.  However, the 
potato's low yield-to-seed ratio exacerbated the impact of repeated shortfalls.  Its 
importance in the Irish diet, coupled with an inadequate policy response from the 
authorities, made the consequences of repeated shortfalls in the 1840s devastating 
(Bourke 1993; Mokyr 1981; Rosen 1999). 
  Ireland was a poor country in 1845, income per head being about half that in the 
rest of the United Kingdom.  The regional contrast between the northeast, which was 
undergoing rapid industrialization at this time, and the west and the south was marked.  
Moreover, while there were some signs of a rise in urban and middle-class living 
standards, the half-century or so before the famine was a period of increasing 
impoverishment for the landless poor (Mokyr and Ó Gráda 1988).  Population rose from 
about five million in 1800 to seven million in 1820 and 8.5 million in 1845.  A rising 
emigration rate and a falling birth rate offered only partial relief to increasing population 
pressure (Boyle and Ó Gráda 1986).  Moreover, demographic adjustment was weakest in 
the western and southern areas most at risk.  The collapse of a largely home-based textile 
industry exacerbated the situation in some rural areas, particularly in north Connacht and 
south Ulster; the result was increasing dependence on the potato and increasing recourse 
  3to seasonal migration during the summer months.  The nutritional content of the potato 
and widespread access to heating fuel in the form of turf eased somewhat the poverty of 
Ireland's three million 'potato people', who were healthier and lived longer than the poor 
in other parts of Europe at the time.  One indication of this, based on evidence from 
military and prison archives, is that adult Irish males from the lower end of the socio-
economic scale on the eve of the famine were at least as tall as, if not taller than, their 
English peers (Ó Gráda 1991; Mokyr and Ó Gráda 1996).  However, their poverty meant 
that when the potato failed, there was no trading down to a cheaper alternative food (Ó 
Gráda 1994: 80-97).  Nowhere else in Europe had the potato, like tobacco a gift from the 
New World, made such inroads into the diet of the poor.  It bears noting that the potato 
also failed throughout Europe in the 1840s.  This brought hardship in many places, and 
excess mortality in the Low Countries and in parts of Germany.  Yet nowhere was 
Ireland's cataclysm repeated (Solar 1997). 
  The first attack of potato blight inflicted considerable hardship on rural Ireland, 
though no significant excess mortality.  The catastrophe of the Great Irish Famine really 
dates from the autumn of 1846, when the first deaths from starvation were recorded.  By 
mid-October 1846 four of the country's 130 workhouses were already full, and three 
months later the workhouses – established under the Irish Poor Law of 1838 – held nearly 
one hundred thousand people.  By the end of 1846 three in five already contained more 
inmates than they had accommodation for, and many were turning away would-be 
inmates (Ó Gráda 1999: 50-2).  Of those still with spare capacity, a third or so were in 
less affected areas in the northeast and east.  Ominously, however, several more were 
located in areas already threatened with disaster, but lacking the resources and the 
  4political will to cope.  Good examples are the workhouses of Ballina, Ballinrobe, 
Ennistymon, Gort, Kilrush, Swinford, and Westport. 
  At first there were the food riots and 'moral economy' protests often associated 
with famines, but these subsided as hope and anger gave way to despair (Eiríksson 
1997b; see too Ó Murchadha 1998: 98-99,170-75).  The numbers of crime reported by 
the police force peaked in 1847, at more than three times the pre-famine (1844) level.  
However, the nature of crime shifted: incidents of cattle- and sheep-rustling rose eleven-
fold, and burglaries and robberies quintupled, while the number of reported rapes 
dropped by two-thirds.  Inmates with no previous conviction formed a rising proportion 
of the prison population and, in Dublin, proportion of inmates from the distant provinces 
of Connacht and Munster rose sharply.  A further indication of the changing nature of 
crime and is that the mean height of both male and female prisoners in Dublin's Newgate 
prison rose during the famine.  Some prison inmates, it is claimed, committed petty 
crimes in order to gain access to prisoners' rations; and that much of famine-era crime 
was driven by desperation is also suggested by the deaths of some of the perpetrators in 
prison from famine-related causes (Ó Gráda 1994: 202-4; 1999: 188-91). 
  The famine did not impact much on Irish politics.  The aging leader of Catholic 
Ireland, Daniel O'Connell, was in poor health at the height of the crisis and died in Genoa 
in May 1847.  An electorate restricted to middle- and upper-class voters increased the 
representation of O'Connellites in Westminster in the general election of July 1847, but 
the Irish M.P.s exerted little pressure on Lord John Russell's weak and divided Whig 
administration.  Nor did extra-parliamentary opposition achieve much: the 'rising' of 1848 
was an improvised, tragic-comic affair that lasted less than a week. 
  5  Ireland's representatives in Westminster were beholden to a tiny, economically-
privileged electorate. In June 1847 only two of them opposed a clause inserted into the 
Poor Law Amendment Act (1847), which drastically reduced the relief entitlements of 
rural smallholders.  Henceforth households occupying more than about 0.1 hectare of 
land were excluded from public relief.  Given the attachment of the poor to their mini-
holdings, this clause is usually deemed to have exacerbated mortality.  Nor was there 
much political solidarity within Ireland: in 1849-50 the so-called 'rate-in-aid', a property 
tax imposed by the authorities in London on richer Irish regions in support of the poorer, 
provoked strong resentment from political spokesmen in loyalist Ulster (Grant 1990). 
  The human carnage reached its peak during the winter and spring of 1846-7, but 
the crisis continued to cost lives for another three or four years.  Like all major famines, 
the Irish potato famine produced many instances of roadside deaths, of neglect of the very 
young and the elderly, of heroism and of anti-social behavior, of evictions, and of a rise 
in crimes against property.  Like all famines, it produced its grotesque cameos of life 
turned upside down and of bonds of friendship and kinship sundered:   
•  In May 1847 two teenage girls sold their hair for 2s 3d (about three times the 
daily wage of an unskilled worker) to a hairdresser in Clonmel, County 
Tipperary, 'an original and extraordinary mode of seeking relief' (Ó Gráda 
1999: 40).   
•  In west Kerry a local poet described how young women might venture out at 
night without fear of harassment from the young blades of the neighbourhood 
(Ó Gráda 1994a: 73). 
  6•  In Ballykilcline in County Roscommon an entire family succumbed to famine 
fever and was not discovered for a week: the men who carried the corpses 'got 
weak and had to be given whiskey' (Ó Gráda 1999: 40).   
•  In May 1847 a mail car traveler sought to help a seventeen-year old girl whose 
child had died on the roadside between Glin and Tarbert.  Unwilling to leave 
the body with nobody to watch over it, the girl too died ‘under the broad 
canopy of Heaven’ (Curtin 2000: 111). 
•  In Cork Denis Lane was found dead in his prison cell after being brought in 
for 'forcibly taking meal from carmen' (Ó Gráda 1994: 204; 1999: 40).   
•  Deaths on the highway gave rise to the term ‘road sickness’.  In Ballydehob in 
west Cork in January 1847 ‘a poor man named John Coughlan from 
Kilbronoge…was on his way to one of these new roads, that lead to nothing 
save death, when he fell from exhaustion and…was numbered with the other 
victims of the Board of Works’ (Hickey 2002: 169). 
•  In May 1847 Thomas Mahon of Ennis relief committee received a letter from 
‘Captain Starlight’, accusing him of inflicting ‘lingering death by starvation’ 
on the poor of the town.  ‘Starlight’ berated Mahon and his committee for 
their meager dole of ‘a quart of a pint of porridge and a penny brown loaf for a 
poor creature for 24 hours’.  ‘Tempt your dogs with it’, he added, ‘and in a 
month you’ll have no dogs’ (Ó Murchadha 1998: 118-9). 
•  There were even rumours of cannibalism, at least in the more restricted sense 
of the flesh of victims being eaten by survivors: in Mayo a starving man was 
reported to have 'extracted the heart and liver...[of] a shipwrecked human 
body…cast on shore' (The Times, May 23
rd, 1849). 
  7  The famine was widely reported in the contemporary press at first, both in Ireland 
and abroad.  It elicited a massive response in terms of private donations for a time, 
especially through the agency of the Roman Catholic Church worldwide and the Society 
of Friends.  Philanthropists in Britain were also moved by Irish suffering, until 
compassion fatigue set in.  Even the Choctaw Nation in faraway Oklahoma subscribed 
$170 for famine relief.  Accessible narrative accounts of the tragedy include Edwards and 





  Much of the historiography of the Irish famine addresses this issue.  Critics of the 
stance of British policy-makers during the Irish famine, both in the 1840s and today, 
castigated them for not doing more.  Accusations of tightfistedness were common: for 
example, the guardians of Fermoy's workhouse in November 1846 pleaded with ministers 
'who gave twenty million to emancipate the slaves, who were never so much to be pitied 
as the people of this country are at present'.  In the Cork Constitution a month later a 
correspondent from devastated Skibbereen 'could not help thinking how much better it 
would be to afford [the poor] some temporary relief in their own homes during this severe 
weather, than thus sacrifice their lives to carry out a miserable project of political 
economy' (cited in Ó Gráda 1996: 104).  Influential ideologues such as Nassau Senior in 
the Edinburgh Review and Thomas Wilson in the Economist urged ministers to err in the 
direction of economy: according to Wilson, 'it [was] no man's business to provide for 
another', and redistribution would only shift resources from 'the more meritorious to the 
  8less' (cited in Ó Gráda 1989: 52).  These points anticipate modern critiques of relief 
policy by the likes of Thomas P. O'Neill (1956) and Christine Kinealy (1994).  
  Supporters of the same policy-makers, then and now, make the points that: (a) the 
backward character of Irish agriculture made disaster inevitable; (b) much was done in an 
era when parsimony and callousness were 'exhibited as much to the English as to the Irish 
poor'; and (c) given widespread corruption in the areas worst affected, further expenditure 
would have saved few lives (e.g. Daly 1986: 114).  In a classic variant of [a], the late 
E.R.R. Green (1984: 273-4) described the famine as 'primarily a disaster like a flood or 
an earthquake', by way of implying that there was little that state intervention could have 
done to save lives.   
  The choice of appropriate relief measures for Ireland was widely debated in the 
press and in parliament in the 1840s.  Some of the debates have quite a modern resonance 
(compare Drèze and Sen 1989).  At first the government opted for reliance on the 
provision of employment through public works schemes, the cost of which was to be split 
between local taxpayers and the central government.  The schemes consisted for the most 
part of small-scale infrastructural improvements; relief considerations constrained their 
size and location.  At their height in the spring of 1847 the works employed seven 
hundred thousand people, or one-in-twelve of the entire population.  The public works 
did not contain the famine, partly because they did not target the neediest, partly because 
the average wage paid was too low (McGregor 2003), and partly because the works 
entailed exposing malnourished and poorly clothed people (mostly men) to the elements 
during the worst months of the year.  
  Exasperated by the ineffectiveness and rising cost of 'workfare', and concerned 
that it was diverting labour from more productive uses in the agricultural sector, early in 
  91847 the authorities decided to phase out the public works and switch to food aid.  The 
publicly-financed soup kitchens which replaced the public works were designed to target 
those most at risk directly.  The food rations were in effect non-transferable and non-
storable.  They reached three million people daily at their peak in early 1847, an 
extraordinary bureaucratic feat.  Doubts remain about the effectiveness of a diet of thin 
meal-based gruel on weakened stomachs, but mortality seemed to fall while the soup 
kitchens operated.   
  The drop in food prices during the summer of 1847 prompted the authorities in 
London to treat the famine henceforth as a manageable, local problem.  The main burden 
of relieving the poor henceforth was placed on the workhouses established under the Irish 
Poor Law of 1838.  Thus the worst hit areas bore the heaviest fiscal burdens.  In principal 
those requiring relief were supposed to pass 'the workhouse test', i.e. refusal to enter the 
workhouse was deemed evidence of being able to support one's self.  In practice, most of 
the workhouses were poorly equipped to meet the demands placed upon them, and in the 
event about one-quarter of all excess famine mortality occurred within their walls.  
Workhouses in the worst affected unions began to fill up in late 1846, and mortality 
within their walls rose in tandem.  Local histories highlight mismanagement and the 
impossible burden placed on local taxpayers government; and, indeed, the high overall 
proportion of workhouse deaths due to contagious diseases is an indictment of this form 
of relief.  Several excellent studies of individual workhouses are available.  These paint a 
mainly negative picture of workhouse management, highlighting venality, overcrowding, 
and incompetence.  They also demonstrate, however, how risky employment in the 
workhouse was: a significant proportion of those so employed perished of famine-related 
diseases (O'Neill 1956; Kinealy 1994; Ó Murchadha 1997). 
  10  Measurable yardsticks of union performance are available: a poorly-managed 
union might be one that was relatively late to open, or in which mortality from infectious 
diseases was relatively high, or in which the overall death rate was relatively high 
(Guinnane and Ó Gráda 2002).  For instance the workhouse in Enniskillen, County 
Fermanagh, opened on 1 December 1845.  Enniskillen, 96
th in terms of poor law 
valuation per head, was only 123
rd of 130 to open.  The late opening of the workhouse 
left little time for ‘non-crisis’ admissions before the famine.  Moreover, a high proportion 
of the Enniskillen dead (about 56-57 per cent) perished from infectious diseases.  This 
meant either that they entered the workhouse in a very bad state, in which case they 
should have been admitted sooner or catered for elsewhere, or else that they contracted an 
infectious disease within the workhouse from another inmate.  Some workhouse 
managements sought to segregate the diseased from the healthy; some did not.  In July 
1847 Enniskillen's guardians voted against building a fever hospital, whereupon its 
medical officer remarked: 'Now that is all over, I have only to say there are 24 persons 
lying of fever in the house, and the rain is dripping down on them at this moment'.  The 
percentages succumbing to marasmus and dropsy (what today is called hunger oedema), 
both famine-related conditions indicating severe malnutrition, were also high in 
Enniskillen relative to neighbouring and similarly-circumstanced unions.  Whether 
inmates succumbing to these diseases acquired them in the workhouse due to inadequate 
diet, or arrived in a dying state and on the verge of starvation, cannot be known, however.  
The very high mortality in some workhouses in 1850 and 1851 is evidence of the long-
lasting character of the famine in some western areas (Guinnane, McCabe, and Ó Gráda 
2004; Eiríksson 1997a; Ó Murchadha 1998). 
  11  Traditional accounts of the famine pit the more humane policies of Sir Robert 
Peel's Tories against the dogmatic stance of Sir John Russell's Whig administration, 
which succeeded them. Peel was forced out of office in July 1846 when his party split on 
the issue of the Corn Laws.  The contrast between Peel and Russell oversimplifies.  
Though Peel was more familiar with Ireland's problems of economic backwardness than 
Whig ideologues such as Chancellor of the Exchequer Charles Wood, the crisis 
confronting Peel in 1845-6 was mild compared to what was to follow.  Moreover, Peel 
broadly supported the Whig line in opposition, and it was left to his former Tory 
colleagues to mount a parliamentary challenge against Russell and Wood.  It was left to 
Tory leader Lord George Bentinck to accuse the Whigs of 'holding the truth down', and to 
predict a time 'when we shall know what the amount of mortality has been'; then, 
Bentinck added, people could judge 'at its proper value [the Whigs'] management of 
affairs in Ireland'.   
Assessment of the public policy response cannot ignore the apocalyptic character 
of the crisis that it faced.  Nonetheless, the government's obsession with parsimony and 
its determination to make the Irish pay for 'their' crisis cannot but have increased the 
death rate. The same goes for the insistence on linking relief with structural reform (e.g. 
by making the surrender of all landholdings a strict condition for relief).  At the height of 
the crisis the policy stance adopted by the Whigs was influenced by Malthusian 
providentialism, i.e. the conviction that the potato blight was a divinely ordained remedy 
for Irish overpopulation. The fear that too much kindness would entail a Malthusian 
lesson not learnt also conditioned both the nature and extent of intervention (Gray 1999). 
This stance rationalized caution, circumscribed relief, and shifted the responsibility to 
Irish property-owners.  Compassion on the part of the British elite was in short supply.   
  12  Though Ireland was a highly bureaucratized polity by mid-nineteenth century 
standards, administrators in Dublin and London still faced the challenge of how best to 
identify and relieve the destitute in remote areas.  Critics of relief could point to many 
instances of red tape, incompetence, and corruption.  The case of the workhouses has 
already been mentioned; cheating and favouritism were also features of the public works 
and, to a lesser extent, the soup kitchens.  On the other hand, the authorities had the 
benefit of a numerous and able police force and of hard-working and well-informed 
clergy of all denominations.  And relieving officers ensured that many abuses were short-
lived (Kerr 1996; Ó Gráda 1999: Ch. 2). 
 
 
 DEMOGRAPHIC CONSEQUENCES 
  The Irish famine killed about one million people, or one-eighth of the entire 
population.  This made it a major famine, relatively speaking, by world-historical 
standards.  In pre-1845 Ireland famines were by no means unknown – those caused by a 
combination of war and poor harvests in the early 1650s and arctic weather conditions in 
1740-41 killed as high a share of much smaller populations (Lenihan 1997; Dickson 
1998) – but those that struck during the half-century or so before the Great Famine were 
mini-famines by comparison. The excess death toll of a million is an informed guess, 
since in the absence of civil registration excess mortality cannot be calculated directly 
(Mokyr 1985; Boyle and Ó Gráda 1986).  The record of deaths in the workhouses and 
other public institutions is nearly complete, but the recording of other deaths depended on 
the memory of survivors in households where deaths had taken place.  In many homes, of 
course, death and emigration meant that there were no survivors.  The estimate does not 
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afield (Mokyr 1981; Neal 1998).  On the basis of an analysis of a large sample of 
surviving baptismal registers, Joel Mokyr put the drop in the birth rate at the height of the 
crisis at one-third.  This was the product of reduced fecundity, reduced libido, and a 
lower marriage rate.
2
  Within Ireland mortality was regionally very uneven.  No part of the island 
escaped entirely, but the toll ranged from one-quarter of the population of some western 
counties to negligible fractions in Down and Wexford on the east coast.  The timing of 
excess mortality varied too, even in some of the worst hit areas.  In west Cork, a 
notorious black spot, the worst was over by late 1847, but the deadly effects of the famine 
ranged in Clare until 1850 or even 1851.  Infectious diseases – especially typhoid fever, 
typhus and dysentery/diarrhea – rather than literal starvation were responsible for the 
bulk of mortality. By and large, the higher the death toll in a county or province, the 
higher the proportion of starvation deaths. While Karl Marx was almost right to claim 
that the Irish famine killed 'poor devils only', many who were not abjectly poor and 
starving died of famine-related diseases.  Medical progress, by shielding the rich from 
infection, has made subsequent famines even more class-specific.  As in most famines, 
the elderly and the young were most likely to succumb, but women proved marginally 
more resilient than men.  The slightly lower excess death rate of women was due to 
physiological rather than cultural factors (Ó Gráda 1999: 101-04; Mokyr and Ó Gráda 
2002). 
                                                 
2 There was also a marked decline in the number of rapes recorded during the famine (Ó Gráda 
1994: 203). 
  14  The famine also resulted in emigration on a massive scale.  Again precise 
estimates are impossible. Though the emigrants were also victims of the famine, their 
departure improved not only their own survival chances, but also those of the majority 
who remained in Ireland.  True, the Atlantic crossing produced its own carnage, 
particularly in Quebec's Grosse-Isle, but most of those who fled made it safely to the 
other side. There thus is a sense in which migration was a crude form of disaster relief, 
and that more public spending on subsidized emigration would have reduced the 
aggregate famine death toll (Ó Gráda and O'Rourke 1997).  Most of those who emigrated 
relied on their own resources, though some landlords helped through direct subsidies or 
by relieving those who left of their unpaid rent bills.  For the most part, the landless poor 
simply could not afford to leave. 
  While migration saved lives in Ireland, it led to increased mortality across the 
Irish Sea.  In England and Wales mortality was one hundred thousand above trend in the 
1846-48 period: however, its distribution between arrivals from Ireland and natives 
succumbing to famine diseases is not known.  There was also a drop in the birth rate in 
England and Wales in the late 1840s, indicating that the crisis was not solely an import 
from John Bull's Other Island.  In Scotland, virtually all the excess mortality was in the 
cities.  In Glasgow burials doubled in 1847. This might be seen as the result of the influx 
of destitute Highlanders, but immigration into Glasgow from Ireland easily exceeded that 
from the Highlands.  So the Irish famine may also have been mainly responsible for the 
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  Like all famines, the Irish famine produced its hierarchy of suffering.  The rural 
poor, landless or near-landless, were most likely to perish, and the earliest victims were in 
that category.  Farmers found their effective land endowment reduced, since their 
holdings could no longer yield the same quantity of potatoes as before.  They also faced 
increased labor costs, forcing them to reduce their concentration on tillage.  Between 
1847 and the early 1850s hundreds of thousands of smallholders and landless or semi-
landless labourers were evicted by hard (and sometimes hard-pressed) landlords and by 
unsentimental land agents.  Proprietors employed bailiffs to carry out the evictions and 
demolish cabins, while the police stood by (O'Neill 2000).  Thus it is hardly surprising 
that although the recorded labour force fell by nearly one-fifth between 1841 and 1851, 
the number of bailiffs rose by over one-third (Ó Gráda 2001: 125).  
  Landlords' rental income plummeted by as much one-third while the crisis lasted, 
while their outlays on poor relief rose.  Naturally, historians have linked the high 
bankruptcy rate of landowners in the wake of the famine to these pressures: in the words 
of one, 'up to one quarter of all land changed hands as a result of Famine-induced 
bankruptcy among landowners'.  A corollary is that landlords who were spared were too 
impoverished to buy up the properties that came on the market in the wake of the crisis, 
leaving the way open to nouveau riche shopkeepers and lawyers.  These arguments 
contain a strong element of post hoc ergo propter hoc.  In reality most of the sales 
processed through the Incumbered Estates Court from 1849 on were of estates so 
financially embarrassed that debts accruing from the famine can have accounted but for a 
small fraction of the total.  Alas, the proprietors of such estates were poorly equipped to 
  16help their tenants when the famine struck (see Essay IV below; also Ó Gráda 1999: 128-
9). 
  It is natural to focus on agriculture and on the countryside, but no sector of the 
economy was unscathed.  Banks had to cope with bad debts and massive withdrawals of 
deposits. Retail sales declined.  Pawnbrokers found their pledges being unredeemed as 
the crisis worsened.  Least affected were those businesses and their work forces who 
relied on foreign markets for their raw materials and their sales.  Many clergymen, 
medical practitioners, poor law officials, and others in contact with the poor paid the 
ultimate price, dying of infectious diseases.   
  The relative impact of the famine on different occupational groups may be 
inferred from comparing the 1841 and 1851 censuses.  The overall decline in the labor 
force was 19.1 per cent.  There were 14.4 per cent fewer farmers, and 24.2 per cent fewer 
farm laborers.  Not surprisingly, given their vulnerability, the number of physicians and 
surgeons dropped by 25.3 per cent.  The small number of coffin makers (eight in 1841, 
twenty-two in 1851) is a reminder that during the famine most coffins were not made by 
specialist coffin makers.  It is difficult to identify any significant class of 'winners' in the 
1840s, though the census indicates increases in the numbers of millers and bakers, of 
barristers and attorneys, and of bailiffs and rate collectors.  The huge fall in the numbers 
of spinners and weavers was partly a consequence of the famine, partly due to other 
causes (Ó Gráda 1999: ch. 4; 2001). 
  The famine was also very uneven regionally.  Its impact on Ireland's metropolis is 
worth brief consideration.  Dublin’s population of 250,000 people contained a large 
underclass of desperately poor people, but their diet was more varied and less dependent 
on the Lumper potato (an inferior, tasteless variety) than that of the rural poor.  Yet at the 
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neutral country' imagined long ago by economists Patrick Lynch and John Vaizey (1960).  
Several sources – burial records, censal evidence, religious records, poor law registers – 
imply excess mortality in Dublin, and not only of unfortunate country people seeking 
work and relief.  Moreover, all creeds were affected: burials in the Society of Friends 
graveyard in Cork Street rose from an average of fourteen in 1841-46 to twenty-five in 
1847-51.  Yet the excess death rate in Dublin was but a fraction of that in the west coast 
(Ó Gráda 1999: ch. 5). 
 
 
FAMINE AND FOOD MARKETS 
  Berthold Brecht once wrote that famines don’t just happen; they are organized by 
the grain trade.  In Ireland in the late 1840s many poor people doubtless believed that the 
determination of traders or producers to corner markets or to extract higher prices 
exacerbated the famine.  However, an analysis of price data suggests that at least at 
wholesale level markets worked more or less as normal.  Nor does the evidence of sales 
at Cork's potato markets support the belief that during the famine traders held back a 
higher-than-normal proportion of output earlier in the season (Ó Gráda 1999: 134-56).  
That is not to say that supplies responded to price signals like clockwork: on the contrary, 
merchants responded cautiously to the challenge of finding substitute foods (mainly 
maize) for the potato.  However, as Amartya Sen (1981: 160) reminds us, 'the law stands 
between food availability and food entitlement.  Starvation deaths can reflect legality 
with a vengeance'.  Alas, for those stripped of subsistence by the blight, the functioning 
of food markets was somewhat of a red herring.  
  18  Table 2, based on a table in an important paper by Peter Solar, is a stark reminder 
of the point that markets worked slowly.  Comparing the two periods, 1840-5 and 1846-
50, captures the fall in production but also suggests that imports largely made up for the 
shortfall in production.  However, this ignores the lag between the failures of the potato 
in 1845 and 1846 and the arrival of large quantities of imports of Indian corn in the spring 
of 1847.  Treating the 1846-50 period as a block muffles the serious supply problems in 
1846-7 in particular (Solar 1989; Ó Gráda 1994: 200-1).  During the famine Ireland 
switched from being one of Britain's bread-baskets to being a net importer of food-grains.  
However, in the winter and spring of 1846-7 more was exports still exceeded imports, 
presumably because the poor in Ireland lacked the purchasing power to buy the wheat 
and oats that were being shipped out. 
 
 
TABLE 2. AGGREGATE IRISH FOOD SUPPLIES, 1840-5 AND 1846-50 
(in 1,000 m.  kcal/day) 
 
      1840-5      1846-50 
Irish production (less seed and horses)        32.1        15.7 
Less exports and non-food uses      -11.8        -3.1 
Net domestic supplies        20.3        12.6 
Plus imports        +0.2        +5.5 
Total consumption        20.5        18.1 
  




 POST-FAMINE ADJUSTMENT   
  19  The Great Irish Famine was not just a watershed in Irish history, but also a major 
event in global history, with far-reaching and enduring economic and political 
consequences.  In the 1840s the Irish cataclysm dwarfed anything occurring elsewhere in 
Europe.  Nothing like it would happen in Ireland again.  Individual memories of the 
famine, coupled with 'collective memory' of the event in later years, influenced the 
political culture of both Ireland and Irish-America, and indeed still play a role (Cullen 
1997; Donnelly 2000; Ó Gráda 2001).  The blight’s damage was long-lasting too: 
although the introduction of new potato varieties offered some respite against 
phythophtera infestans in the post-famine decades, no reliable defense would be found 
against it until the 1890s. 
  The famine brought the era of famines in Ireland to a brutal end.  Serious failures 
of the potato in the early 1860s and late 1870s, also due to potato blight, brought 
privation in the west of the country, but no significant excess mortality.  Ireland thus does 
not lend much support to the claim advanced by Jane Menken and Susan Watkins that 
famines typically create a demographic vacuum that is quickly filled.  Other famines, it is 
true, seem to fit such a model, but in Ireland in only a few remote and tiny pockets in the 
west did population fill the vacuum left by the 'Great Hunger', and then only very briefly 
(Watkins and Menken 1985; Ó Gráda 1994: 190; Guinnane 1997).   
  What of the Irish famine's long-term economic impact?  The relative importance 
of the arable component in agricultural output dropped sharply in its wake.  Crops 
accounted for nearly two-thirds of net output in 1840-5, but less than a quarter in 1876 
and only one-seventh in 1908 (Ó Gráda 1993: 57, 154).  The famine resulted in higher 
living standards for survivors, since it increased the bargaining power of labor.  Any 
negative impact on landlords' income from a declining population was more than 
  20compensated for by the relative increase in the prices of land-intensive output, the 
disappearance of thousands of uneconomic holdings, and the prompter payment of rents 
due.  Higher emigration was another by-product of the famine, as the huge outflow of the 
crisis years generated its own 'friends and neighbors' dynamic.  The late Raymond Crotty, 
an agricultural economist, claimed in a classic contribution that most of these changes 
would have taken place in any case, famine or no famine: the disaster only accelerated 
structural and demographic shifts already in train.  So did the famine 'matter' in the long 
run?  Kevin O'Rourke submitted Crotty's hypothesis to computable general equilibrium 
analysis in 1991, and found it wanting: the main reason being the profound impact of 
phythophtera infestans on the pasture/tillage balance in Irish agriculture.  O'Rourke's 
simulations suggested that had the potato remained healthy, but allowing for exogenous 
price shocks and an annual one per cent rise in real wages, by 1870 agricultural 
employment would have fallen by two per cent instead of the actual forty-five per cent, 
and potato output would have risen marginally instead of plummeting by four-fifths 
(Crotty 1966; O'Rourke 1991).  Thus the famine, far from being a mere catalyst, was a 
watershed event in nineteenth-century Irish history. 
  In the early 1980s, one eminent Irish historian claimed that 'even the scale of the 
great famine was not unique when seen in the context of contemporary European 
experience'.  That was just before a burgeoning historiography began to reassert the 
cataclysmic dimensions of the Irish famine.  Modern research comes closer to supporting 
instead Amartya Sen’s surmise that '[in] no other famine in the world [was] the 
proportion of people killed…as large as in the Irish famines in the 1840s' (Boyce 1982: 
170; Sen 1995).  During the 1990s research into the Irish famine, prompted in part by 
sesquicentennial commemorations, reached unprecedented levels.  Scores of monographs 
  21and articles were published, many of them of high quality (for surveys see Ó Gráda 1996; 
Daly 2003).  These included several studies of the crisis at local level (e.g. O'Neill 1997; 
Eiríksson 1997; Ó Murchadha 1998; Hickey 2002).   
  Several issues require further investigation, however.  For instance, whether or 
not the famine led to the decline of certain native industries by reducing the domestic 
market remains a moot point (Whelan 1999).  The long-run impact of the famine on the 
health of survivors conceived or born during or in the wake of the famine is another un-
researched topic (compare Lumey 1998).  Other issues calling for further work are: 
evictions and their impact on mortality, the evaluation of crisis management at the local 
level, the extent and consequences of famine-induced internal migration, the functioning 
of food and credit markets at retail level, and the role of maize as a substitute for the 
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